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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
RAY NAISBITT, Guardian ad litem
for DARRYL R. NAISBITT,aminor,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 8385

JOSEPH EGGETT,
Defendant and Respondent,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

The Defendant had an automobile whieh was out of
repair and the motor was not in good working order.
The ear would not operate when moving forward and
the Defendant proceeded to operate the car in a backward motion backing up a hill since the engine would
die when an atte~mpt was made to move forward. The
engine would run only while backing T 161-2-27. The
Defendant observed a sign on the road where Plaintiff
was hurt whic;h indicated "Stop, Coas'ting Lane" T 168-
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8 & 167-23. The Defendant had seen sleigh riders on
the hill the day before the collision and knew there had
been a sleigh riding accident on said road the night before T. 167-19-25.
The Defendant sraw a car going up this hill, but
paid no attention to whether or not the vehicle contained
a sleigh or sleigh riders T 166. The car actually contained the Plaintiff who, with other boys, went up to the
top of the hill in the car. The Plaintiff, a child 11 years
of age, lay prone on the other boys all on the sleigh,
Plaintiff being the third one on the sled and a guest of
the boy on the bottom. The boys came down the hill in
about a minute after arriving at the top of the hill. The
boy on the bottom of the sled was the operator and driver.
Plaintiff had nothing to do with steering the sled. As
the sleigh proceeded down the hill the defendant approached a curve in the road T 162-28. The Defendant
was backing up and was on the north or the wrong side
of the road for vehicles proceeding in an easterly direction or Defendant was on his left hand side of the
road T 162-11, see also "Exhibits E and N". The sleigh
was also at this time approaching the blind curve in the
road. The Defendant knew of this curve in the road and
that the cut and scrub oak obscured vision around the
curve. See "Exhibit E". Defendant also knew that the
lane was being used by children for sleigh riding and
nevertheless continued to back his car up on the wrong
side of the road and without sounding his horn as he
approached the blind curve and without giving any
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warnimg T. 169-19. The sleigh came around the curve
on its right hand side of the road and the force of inertia
and centrifugal force forced the sled to its right side
or proper side and it ran into the back end of the Defendant's car. Defendant first saw the sled round the
curve when it was 10 feet away at which time he applied
the brakes and stopped directly in the path of the sled
T 163-8. The resulting accident destroyed a part of
Plaintiff's brain T 34-11, resulting in loss of memory,
defective sight, and probable epilepsy.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT ONE
NEGLIGENCE IS A QUESTION FOR THE JURY, AND
UNLESS ALL REASONABLE MEN MUST DRAW THE SAME
CONCLUSION FROM THE FACTS AS THEY ARE SHOWN,
THE COURT COMMITS ERROR IN DIRECTING A VERDICT.
POINT TWO
A COURT EXERCISING APPELLATE JURISDICTION
IN REVIEWING A JUDGMENT OF A LOWER COURT,
WHEREIN A VERDICT WAS DIRECTED, VIEWS ALL EVIDENCE AND DRAWS ALL INFERENCES IN LIGHT MOST
FAVORABLE TO THE PARTY AGAINST WHOM THE VERDICT WAS DIRECTED.

POINT THREE
IF THE FACTS ARE SUCH THAT REASONABLE MEN
CAN REACH THE CONCLUSION THAT THE DEFENDANT
WAS NEGLIGENT, OR THAT PLAINTIFF WAS OR WAS
NOT CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT THE CASE MUST
GO TO THE JURY.
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ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
NEGLIGENCE IS A QUESTION FOR THE JURY, AND
UNLESS ALL REASONABLE MEN MUST DRAW THE SAME
CONCLUSION FROM THE FACTS AS THEY ARE SHOWN,
. THE COURT COMMITS ERROR IN DIRECTING A VERDICT.

The laws of the State of Utah make it a misdemeanor
to operate a motor vehicle upon the highway of the state
when the vehicle is in an unsafe condition, 41-6-117, U.
C.A., 1953.
Moreover, 41-6-155, U.C.A., 1953, provides that no
1

person may move a motor vehicle upon a highway unless
the same is in good working order. The Defendant h~as
admitted that his vehicle was not in good working order,
and that it would not operate in a forward motion, and
it would only run backward. Motor vehicles are equipped
to steer only the front wheels and one cannot use the
back wheels to steer the ear and it is most difficult to
drive backward. The horn is equipped to throw the sound
ahead of the car and not to the rear and the car is constructed to provide maximum visibility in the front with
poor visibility to the rear. The jury were entitled to
consider whether or not the Defendant was in violation
of these statutes or otherwise negligent.
Negligence is a question for the jury, and unless
all reasonable men must draw the same conclusion from
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the facts as they are shown, a court commits an error
when it directs a verdict. The following cases hold fast
to this rule :
Bates vs. Burns, 281 P. 2d 209, ______u ........

"(2) It has been frequently announced by
this court that negligence is a question for the
jury unless all reasonable men must draw the
same conclusion from the facts as they are
shown. * *"'
'Where there is uncertainty as to the existence of either negligence or contributory negligence, the question is not one of law, but of fact,
and to be settled by a jury; and this whether, the
uncertainty arises from a conflict in the testimony, or because, the facts being undisputed, fairminded men will honestly draw different conclusions from them.' ''
Scoffield vs. Sp:rouse-Reitz Co., 265 P. 2d 396,
397; 1 u. 2d 218.

"(1) Unless all reasonable minds must conclude that plaintiff was negligent in failing to observe the conditions before attempting to descend
the stairs, the question of his due care must be
submitted to the jury for determination. Baker
vs. Decker, Utah, 212 P. 2d 679."
Morby vs. Rogers, 252 P. 2d 231, ______u ........
"(1) (1) It is well settled that in order for
a court to grant a request for a directed verdict
or for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict
grounded on non-negligence of defendant, the record must disclose no -evidence against the party
so requesting upon which reasonable minds could
find him guilty of the negligence charged. The
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issue here, then, was whether the reeord disclosed
any evidence upon which the jury could have found
the appellant guilty of negligence.
"(2) It is not a new or novel principle that
acts of negligence may he proved by circumstances. Certainly, in many cases, particularly
where the only eye witnesses are parties having
an interest in the action, such circumstances are
the only means by which certain facts may be discovered. In sueh cases it is proper that such
circumstances should be evaluated by the jury in
whose province lies the power to believe or disbelieve the testimony and evidence, to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses, and to draw such
reasonable conclusions from the whole record as
may be warranted.
"(3) We are of the opinion that reasonable
minds eould find negligence on the part of the
defendant from the evidence in the record. The
trial court therefore did not err in letting the
question of defendant's negligence go to the jury
under the evidence.''

Stickel vs. Union Pacific R. Co., 251 P. 2d
867, 870; ------D·------·
"(5, 6) The authorities frequently state
that the question of contributory negligence is
usually for the jury. And that this is so wherever
the evidence is such that reasonable minds may
differ as to its existence has been stated innumberable times, which is undoubtedly correct. However, in view of the fact that before the issue may
be taken from jury, the defendant has the burden
of establishing plaintiff's negligence by a preponderance of the evidence it may be a bit more
precise to state that the question of contributory
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negligence is for the jury whenever the evidence
is such that jurors, acting fairly and reasonably,
may say that they are not convinced by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff was
guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to cause his own injury.''
Martin vs. Stevens, 243 P. 2d 747, ______u _______ .
"(3) The question of contributory negligence is usually for the jury and the court should
be reluctant to take consideration of this question
of fact from it. Nielson vs. Mauchley, Utah, 202
P. 2d 547; Toomer's Estate vs. Union Pacific
Railroad Co., Utah, 239 P. 2d 163. The expressions in those cases are in accord with this uniformly accepted doctrine. The right to trial by
jury should be safeguarded. Before the issue of
contributory negligence may be taken from the
jury, the defendant's burden of proving both (a)
that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, and (b) that such negligence proximately
contributed to cause his own injury, must be met,
and established with such certainty that reasonable minds could not find to the contrary; conversely, if there is any reasonable basis, either
because of lack of evidence, or from the evidence
and the fair inferences arising therefrom, taken
in the light most favorable to plaintiff, upon which
reasonable minds may conclude that they are not
convinced by a preponderance of the evidence
either (a) that plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence or (b) that such negligence proximately contributed to cause the injury, the plaintiff is entitled to have the question submitted to
a jury."

Nielson vs. Mauchley, 202 P. 2d 547, 115 U.
68.
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'' (3) In holding that the court erred in finding as a matter of law that plaintiff was guilty
of contributory negligence, we do not wish to
understand that the jury could not have so found.
Whether or not plaintiff acted as a reasonably
prudent man under the circumstances is a question of fact for the jury to determine. The mere
fact that plaintiff had the right of way did not
give him a right to proceed without regard to
existing conditions. He must exercise due care
and act as a reasonably prudent man would act
under all the existing circumstances. See Bullock
vs. Luke, 98 Utah 501, 98 P. 2d 350; Hickok vs.
Skinner, Utah, 190 P. 2d 514; Conklin vs. Walsh,
Utah, 193 P. 2d 437; and McDougall vs. Morrison,
55 Cal. App. 2d 92, 130 F. 2d 149, on page
151. * * *
''In our discussion we have only considered
facts most favorable to plaintiff, and have not discussed the evidence of the defendant. A jury
might find from all the circumstances that the
facts and circumstances we have assumed did not
exist and that the accident happened in accordance with defendant's version. If a jury so found
the facts, plaintiff could not recover.
''Since the court erred in directing a verdict
of "no cause for action" the case is reversed with
instructions to grant a new trail. Costs to appellant."
POINT TWO
A COURT EXERCISING APPELLATE JURISDICTION
IN REVIEWING A JUDGMENT OF A LOWER COURT,
WHEREIN A VERDICT WAS DIRECTED, VIEWS ALL EVIDENCE AND DRAWS ALL INFERENCES IN LIGHT MOST
FAVORABLE TO THE PARTY AGAINST WHOM THE VERDICT WAS DIRECTED.
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Gle'fbn vs. Gibbons & Reed Co., 265 P. 2d 1013,
1 u. 2d 308.

"Defendant's contention that there was no
actionable negligence on the part of the defendant
presents a more difficult question, Inasmuch as
the defendant was granted a directed verdict, we
must view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff to determine whether or not there
was sufficient evidence to go to the jury. Finlayson vs. Brady, Utah, 240 P. 2d 491."
Smith vs. Bennett, 1 U. 2d 224, 265 P. 2d 401.
''The evidence and all reasonable inferences
therefrom will be viewed in a light most favorable
to plaintiff. Cox vs. Thompson, Utah 254 P. 2d
1047."
Scoville vs. Kellogg Sales Co., 1 U. 2d 19, 261
P. 2d 933.

"We must view the evidence in a light most
favorable to plaintiff, the victim of the directed
verdict.''
Oibbs et al vs. Blue Cab, Inc., 249 P. 2d 213,
......U ........
"We have held that where a verdict is directed, the evidence on appeal will be canvassed
in a light most favorable to him against whom it
was directed.''
Galarowicz vs. VJ?;ard, 119 U. 611, 230 P. 2d
576.
"(1) A nonsuit having been granted in their
favor, we take all the evidence against the Siegels
as true, and give the plaintiff the benefit of every
favorable inference and intendment which fairly
arises from such evidence. Kitchen vs. Kitchen,
83 Utah 370, 28 P. 2d 180; Groesbeck vs. Lakeside
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Printing Company, 55 Utah 335, 186 P. 013;
Maberto vs. Wolfe, 106 Cal. App.; 202, 289 P.
218. ''
Dunga;n vs. Brandenberg, 230 P. 2d 518.

'' 'Ordinarily an appellate court in determiningan appeal views the evidence, where it is conflicting, in the light most favorable to a sustaining
of the lower court's judgment. (Citing cases). A
reverse rule however applies where, as here the
trial court directs the jury to return a verdict
for the defendants. The conflicting evidence then
must be viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff.' ''
The supreme court of Arizona in the above caption
case held that where a truck driver was backing a truck
that he owes the child to duty to protect him from being
injured by the truck and that any evidence at all upon
which reasonable men might disagree would require
that the case go to a jury.
POINT THREE
IF THE FACTS ARE SUCH THAT REASONABLE MEN
CAN REACH THE CONCLUSION THAT THE DEFENDANT
w·As NEGLIGENT, OR THAT PLAINTIFF WAS OR WAS
NOT CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT THE CASE MUST
GO TO THE JURY.

The Plaintiff was a guest and had no control over
the operation of the sled, and there was no evidence of
any contributory negligence chargable to a guest.
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STANDARD OF CARE
vVhenever an individual undertakes to do something
which involves a greater risk to those whom he owes a
duty, the law holds him to a higher degree of care. At
168-8 of the record it is pointed out that Defendant had
seen a sign at the bottom of the road which designated
the road as a coasting lane. At T. 167-18 it was pointed
out that Defendant had actually seen sleighriders on the
road before, and that the night before he knew there
had been an accident involving a sleighrider. These
facts can be construed in no other way than that the
defendant knew or ought to have known that the hill
was going to be used by children for sleighriding.
The conduct of small children is unpredictable. They
fall within a class which is highly protected by the law.
As a result, whenever an adult does anything which involves a risk to children the law im·poses upon him an
extremely high degree of care.
The act of backing an automobile involves a greater
risk than driving the automobile forward. The controls
are constructed to facilitate and provide maneuverability
only for forward travel. The only wheels capable of
turning to alter the direction of the car are the front
wheels. When a car is backing these wheels are not in
a position to provide maximum maneuverability needed
to avoid hitting children. The driver's vision is more
obstructed when a car is being driven in reverse than
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when moving forward. This all adds up to the fact
that driving an automobile in reverse involves greater
risk than when driving it forward.
The above points to the fact that the defendant was
acting in such a manner as to involve a great risk to those
using the sleighriding hill. The following cases illustrate
the fact that the law requires of a person in such circumstances a special standard of care :
Callahwn vs. Disorda, 16 A. 2d 179, 181.

"(8-10) Taking the evidence in the light
most favorable for the plaintiff, as it must be
taken, the jury would have been justified in finding that the defendant knew or ought to have
known that the child was in the immediate neighborhood. She was charged with the common knowledge that very young children are erratic and
likely to move quickly and without regard for
their own safety. If one knows that a child is
in the highway he is bound to a proportionate degree of watchfulness. Robinson vs. Cone, 22 Vt.
213, 224; 54 Am. Dec. 67. She testified that before starting to back her car she looked into the
mirror and out of the left-hand window but since
the child must have been on the right of the rear
of the car it seems clear that these precautions
alone could not be relied upon with a due regard
for the child's safety. In a recent Massachusetts
case it was said: 'The backing of any vehicle entails more or less limitation on the view by the
driver of the area to be traversed and thus requires corresponding vigilance on his part to
avoid causing injury to persons who are known
to be, or likely to be there, whether the vehicle
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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is being backed on a public street or on private
land.' Eaton vs. S. S. Pierce Co., 288 Mass., 323,
192 N.E. 831, 832."

Springer vs. Sodestrom, 129 P. 2d 409, 502.
"(7, 8) The conduct of small children is unpredictable, and their propensity to run in any
direction is a matter of common knowledge.
Having once observed the child on the opposite
curb while his vehicle was still motionless in the
driveway, defendant's conduct in backing into
the street without making any further effort to
ascertain the conduct and whereabouts of the
small child was not that of a reasonable careful
and prudent person under the circumstances.

* * :t"
Jenkins vs. Bentley, 268 N.W. 819.

'' * * * True, the driver did not see the boy
before backing into him, yet the law imposes upon
him a duty to ascertain that the way is clear before proceeding backward over it. Backing
against plaintiff without making such assuring
observation is a lack of ordinary care and is sufficient to constitute actionable negligence. Kinsley
vs. Simpson, 257 Mich. 7, 240 N.W. 98; Roach vs.
Petrequin, 234 Mich. 551, 208 N.W. 695. '~**'And
he must not only look backward when he commences his operation but he must continue to look
backward in order that he may not collide with
or injure those lawfully using such street or highway. (Citing authorities) ' See, also, Embry vs.
Reserve Natural Gas Co., 12 La. App. 97, 124 So.
472. * * *"
21 Blashfield Page 400 1469-Backing
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''Where a motorist, proceeding along one
street car track while a street car is moving in
the same direction alongside of him on the other
tract, sees two small children on the tract in front
of him, the necessity of the children leaving the
track being apparent, and, instead of stopping,
turns aside to avoid the children and strikes them
as they attempt to run from the track to the
street the question of whether the driver exercised
proper care towards the children is for the jury.
Ferris vs. McArdle, 106 A. 460, 92 N.J.L. 580."
"Where motorist sitting in his automobile in
driveway observed through rear view mirror that
small child was on the opposite curb, motorist's
conduct in thereafter backing into the street without makimg any further effort to ascertain the
conduct and whereabouts of the child was negligent S.pringer vs. Sodestrom, 129 P. 2d 499, 54
Cal. App. 2d 704. ''
McCarthy et al. vs. City of St. Paul et al., 276
N.W.2.

'' * * * This and other courts have frequently
commented upon the high degree of vigilance
necessary to constitute ordinary care where children may reasonably be expected to be present.
In the case at bar the defendants were engaged in
resurfacing one of the defendant city's streets
and were using heavy blade and disk machines
for that purpose. * * * It was as he started backing that the machine ran into and injured young
McCarthy, who was then apparently looking back
toward the foreman's car. * * * The backing process was not naturally to be expected, and we
think that the jury might well have considered
that Byron was guilty of negligence in not better
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looking out for or warning the boys, who, as he
knew, were aceustomed to play around the
machine. * * *''
Whenever a person is acting under sueh circumstances as to be required to exercise a s~pecial degree of
care, if he fails to do so he is negligent. At (T. 162-11)
of the record it is established that the defendant was
on the wrong side of the street for the direction of his
vehicle. This court has already dealt with the matter
of driving on the wrong side of the street.

Station et al. vs. West Macaroni Mfg. Co.,
174 P. 817, 52 Utah 426.
'' * * * More especially, we think, the strongest kind of a presumption of negligence should
be held to prevail against a party, where, as here,
the defendant is found encroaching on that portion
of the much-used street of a city assigned by
the statute to another. * * *"

Weenig Bros. vs. Manning, 262 P. 2d 491,
1 u. 2d 101.

"* * * It is to be conceded that being on the
wrong side of the highway is usually a strong
indication of negligence. * * * ''
In this particular instance driving on the wrong
side of the street was particularly negligent. The defendant had placed himself in a position requiring the
highest degree of care.

Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. et al. vs. Courtney, 79 P. 2d 235;
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Butts vs. Anthis, 73 P. 2d 843.
''A person guilty of negligence involving a
breach of his duty should be held responsible for
all the consequences which a prudent and experienced man, fully acquainted with all the facts and
circumstances which in fact exist, whether they
could have been ascertained by reasonable diligence or not, would have thought of at the time of
the negligent act as reasonably possible to follow,
if they had been suggested to his mind."
Under the high degree of care imposed upon defendant he should have forseen the fact that when sleds come
around a sharp corner traveling on ice and snow, they
do not hug the inside of the curve, but rather slide or
skid towards the outside of the curve due to the effect
of inertia or centrifugal force upon a body in motion.

The defendant by backing his automobile up the coasting
lane on the wrong side of the street had actually followed
the outer edge of the curve, the probable side of the road
which would be used by children.
Courts have held that there is a duty under similar
circumstances for a defendant to give warning of his
approach. It is to be noted that the defendant herein
GAVE NO W ARNlNG. The following cases illustrate

the necessity of warning and make it a duty:

Cleveland et al. vs. Grays Harbor Dairy Products, Inc., et al, 74 P. 2d 909.
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''Where the driver is backing in a narrow
street where other automobiles are parked and
children a,re playing, it is his duty to sownd his
horn .repeatedly when backing.
"The law does not forbid the backing of an
automobile upon the streets or highways, and to
do so does not constitute negligence, but the
driver of an automobile must exercise ordinary
care in backing his machine, so as not to injure
others by the operation, and this duty requires
that he adopt sufficient means to ascertain
whether others are in- the vicinity who may be
injured. It is his positive duty to look backwards
for approaching vehicles and to give them timely
warning of his intention to back,- when a reasonable necessity for it exists; and he must not only
look backward when he commences his operation,
but he must continue to look backward in order
that he may notcollide with or injure those lawfully using such street or highway. Berry on
Automobiles, 7th Ed., § 2.236.
''To the same effect is Taulborg vs. Anderson, 119 Neb. 273, 228 N.W. 528, 67 A.L.R. 642.
With notes thereto beginning on page '647. J. Cr.
Sheldon vs. James, 175 Cal. 474, 166 P. 8, 2 A.L.R.
1493.
"It may be positively said that the above
texts and cases state the general rule and there
are, apparently, none to the contrary.''
SLEIGHRIDING

Kovacs et al. vs. Ajhar et al., 196 A. 876.

IS

This case is almost directly in point. One difference
that the plaintiff, in the case at bar was using a
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designated coasting lane, which in the case cited plaintiff was not. The following are statements which appear
in the case:
''It is well settled that in determining
whether judgment n.o.v. should be entered for
defendants the testimony should not only be read
in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, all conflicts therein being revolved in their favor, but
they must be given the benefit of every fact and
inference of fact pertaining to the issues involved
which may reasonably be deduced from the evidence.
''Where, under the undisputed facts, coasting
upon a street is clearly and manifestly dangerous,
it may be the duty of the court to so declare as a
matter of law, but where the evidence is conflicting, and the inferences to be drawn are not clear,
the question whether plaintiff has exercised care
and diligence to avoid danger while coasting, such
as to be expected of a reasonably carefully and
prudent man under like circumstances, is for the
jury.

"On the other hand, where a drive,r can see
children at least 50 feet away from a crossing or
knows they are riding on a hill, he is reqwired to
give warning of his approach and take other
reasonable means to guard against accident consistent with the circumstances. Yeager vs. Gately
& Fitzgerald, Inc., 262 Pa. 466, 106 A. 76; Idell vs.
Day, supra; Rossheim vs. Bornot, 310 Pa. 154, 165
A. 27; Fisher vs. Duquesne Brewing Co., supra;
Morris vs. Kauffman, supra. Also Meyers vs.
Central R. Co. of New Jersey, supra. The courts
attention is invited to the fact that defendant
gave absolutely no warning in the case at bar.''
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Smith et al. vs. Pachter, 19 A. 2d 85.
"In determining whether the court was justified in giving binding instructons for the defendant, not only should the testimony be read in a
light most favorable to plaintiffs, all conflicts
therein being resolved in their favor, but plaintiffs must be given the benefit of every fact and
inference of fact pertaining to the issues involved
which may reasonably be deduced from the evidence.

''On the other hand, where a drive,r can see
children on a cross street or knows or ought to
know that children are riding on a hill, he is
required to give warning of his approach and
take other reasonable mearns to guard against
accident consistent with the circumstances.
Everybody knows that a sled has no brakes. Once
In motion it continues until the force of gravity fails
to act upon it, and the force of inertia is overcome by
friction. It has been pointed out that the defendant was
under a Juty to exercise the highest degree of care,
that he failed to do so. Now may it further be pointed
out that defendant was so careless in keeping a lookout
for young sleighriders that he failed to notice the plaintiff until he was only 10 feet from the defendant's car
(T. 163-8) at which time the defendant stopped his car
directly in the path of the plaintiff to his serious injury.
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In the interest of justice this court should not only
order a new trial but should also direct a verdict for
plaintiff and require only proof of damage on the said
trial.
Respectfully submitted,

E. L. SCHOENHALS
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